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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930577-CA 
v. : 
MICHAEL WAYNE PILLING : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant• : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Michael Wayne Pilling appeals from his conviction 
of assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. What is the meaning of "custody" for purposes of 
determining whether defendant was a prisoner at the time he 
assaulted a police officer? This Court reviews a trial court's 
interpretation of a statute for correctness. State v. Jaimez, 
817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991). However, defendant failed to 
present this question to the trial court and has therefore waived 
appellate consideration of it. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 
(Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
2. Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support 
defendant's conviction of assault by a prisoner? In determining 
whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support a jury 
verdict, this Court must "'review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury'" and may reverse "'only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he . . . was convicted.'" State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted). However, defendant has not 
marshalled the evidence in support of his conviction for assault 
by a prisoner, nor shown that the marshalled evidence is so 
inconclusive that a reasonable jury could not have convicted him; 
therefore, this Court need not consider the merits of defendant's 
claim. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d at 
473 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with aggravated assault by a 
prisoner, a second degree felony; escape, a second degree felony; 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony; and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103.5 (1990), 76-8-309 (1990), 
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58-37-8 (Supp. 1993), and 58-37a-5 (1990) (R. 1). After a one-
day trial, a jury convicted defendant of the lesser included 
offense of assault by a prisoner, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 
(1990), and of the two possession charges (R. 28, 29, and 30). 
Defendant moved to dismiss the escape charge because the State 
had not shown that he escaped from a jail or other place of 
confinement (Tr. 166). The State concurred in the motion, and 
the trial court granted it (Tr. 166-67). 
The trial court entered its judgment and commitment to the 
Utah state prison on August 31, 1993, sentencing defendant to 0-5 
years on the assault conviction, 0-5 years on the possession of a 
controlled substance conviction, and 6 months on the possession 
of drug paraphernalia conviction, with all sentences to run 
concurrently (R. 42-43) . On appeal, defendant challenges only 
his conviction for assault by a prisoner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on October 11, 1992, Officer Mark 
Watkins received a call about a disturbance at an apartment 
complex in Helper, Utah (Tr. 54-55). After arriving at the 
complex, Officer Watkins determined that the disturbance was 
coming from defendant's apartment (Tr. 56-58). When Officer 
Watkins knocked on the door, defendant invited him into his 
apartment and indicated that there were drugs in the kitchen (Tr. 
60-63) . Officer Watkins could see the kitchen from where he was 
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standing and observed several syringes and a baggie with white 
powder in it (Tr. 63-64) . 
Officer Watkins twice advised defendant that he was under 
arrest; defendant responded both times, "No, I'm not under 
arrest," then ran into the bedroom (Tr. 64). Officer Watkins and 
Officer Wood, who had answered Officer Watkins' request for back-
up, followed defendant into the bedroom, where defendant swung at 
the officers several times (Tr. 65). Officer Watkins swung back 
at defendant with his night stick, but did not hit him (Tr. 65-
66). Defendant stopped swinging at the officers and began 
mumbling and walking toward the bedroom door (Tr. 66). As 
defendant began to walk past the officers, Officer Watkins 
grabbed defendant by the shoulder and again advised him that he 
was under arrest (id.). 
The officers and defendant then walked into the living room, 
where defendant put his hands behind his back and said, "Okay. 
Okay. I'm under arrest" (Tr. 67). Officer Watkins held 
defendant's left arm while Officer Wood attempted to apply 
handcuffs to defendant (id.). However, the handcuffs 
malfunctioned and Officer Wood removed his hand from defendant to 
try to fix them (id.). When he did, defendant "went down into a 
--a stance, pulled something from his crotch area, stood up and 
hit [Officer Watkins] on the side of the head" (id.). Defendant 
escaped from the officers, but was again apprehended 
approximately five minutes later (Tr. 68-72). 
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After taking defendant to the station house, Officer Watkins 
went to Castleview Hospital where his cheek was X-rayed. He was 
advised that his cheek was badly bruised and possibly cracked 
(Tr. 74). His front tooth was also chipped, but Officer Watkins 
sought no treatment for that injury (Tr. 75). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's appellate challenge to his conviction raises two 
issues: (1) what is the meaning of "custody" for purposes of 
applying Utah's assault by a prisoner statute; and (2) does the 
record contain sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that 
defendant was in custody, and therefore a prisoner, at the time 
he assaulted Officer Watkins. 
Defendant concedes that he did not present the issue of the 
proper interpretation of "custody" to the trial court. He has 
also failed on appeal to establish that the trial court committed 
plain error. Defendant argues that he could not have been in 
custody at the time he assaulted Officer Watkins because the 
officers had not succeeded in handcuffing him. However, neither 
the plain meaning of "custody", the interpretation of "custody" 
in contexts similar to that at issue in this case, nor the 
interpretation of "custody" applied in the context of police 
interrogation imposes handcuffing as a requisite element of 
custody. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish either the 
existence of error, or that any such error was obvious. 
Defendant also has not established that there is 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of assault by a 
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prisoner. First, he has failed to marshal all of the evidence in 
support of his conviction, excluding some of the key evidence 
supporting a conclusion that he was in custody at the time he 
assaulted Officer Watkins. Second, he has failed to show that 
the marshalled evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict, is so inadequate or inconclusive that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to 
whether he was in custody. To the contrary, defendant has simply 
recharacterized the evidence in the light most favorable to his 
appellate argument. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The jury convicted defendant of assault by a prisoner 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990). Section 76-5-101 
(1990) defines "prisoner" to include "any person who is in the 
custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest." On 
appeal, defendant argues that because he was not handcuffed at 
the time he assaulted Officer Watkins, he was not in "custody", 
and therefore not a prisoner within the meaning of the assault by 
a prisoner statute under which he was convicted. Appellant's 
Brief at 7-9. 
Defendant's argument requires consideration of two issues: 
(1) what is the meaning of "custody" for purposes of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-5-101 and 76-5-102.5; and (2) does the record contain 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. State 
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v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah App. 1993). See also State 
v. Sinah, 819 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 1991). 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF THE PROPER 
DEFINITION OF "CUSTODY", AND HAS FAILED ON APPEAL TO 
SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF PLAIN ERROR IN THE WAY THE TRIAL 
COURT INTERPRETED CUSTODY.1 
Defendant concedes that he never presented this issue to the 
trial court. Appellant's Brief at 9.2 Appellate courts 
generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal.3 State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993) 
1
 Because defendant did not raise this challenge below, the 
trial court did not expressly interpret the meaning of "custody." 
In asking this Court to review his conviction for plain error, 
however, defendant argues that under a proper interpretation of the 
meaning of "custody" he clearly was not a prisoner, and that the 
trial court should therefore have sua sponte either arrested 
judgment or directed a verdict in his favor. It appears that 
defendant argues that the trial court plainly misinterpreted the 
meaning of "custody" by not finding that he was not in custody as 
a matter of law. 
2
 In admitting that he did not raise this issue below, 
defendant argues that his trial counsel should have moved for 
directed verdict or requested an instruction on the lesser offense 
of Assault Against Peace Officer. Appellant's Brief at 9. In the 
footnote, defendant cites Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984) . However, defendant does not raise ineffective assistance 
as a basis for reversal; he simply mentions Strickland in a 
footnote. 
3
 Although conceding that he failed to raise this issue 
below, defendant does state that he argued in the trial court that 
he was not a prisoner at the time of the assault. Appellant's 
Brief at 9-10 n.3. However, defendant does not and cannot argue 
that the argument he presented below preserved his appellate 
argument. Defendant's counsel argued to the jury that he was not 
in custody because as defendant claimed, the officers did not tell 
him he was under arrest until after the assault (Tr. 208) . 
Defendant implicitly premised his argument on the assumption that 
if the officers had told him he was under arrest prior to the 
assault, defendant would have been a prisoner within the meaning of 
the statute (id.). Thus, defendant's argument to the jury simply 
7 
(citations omitted) (applying the waiver doctrine to a 
constitutional challenge to the statute under which defendant was 
convicted). Therefore, defendant must establish the existence of 
plain error in order to justify appellate review of the merits of 
his argument. Id. Defendant can succeed on a plain error 
argument only if he can establish all three of the following 
elements: (1) that the trial court erroneously interpreted the 
meaning of "custody"; (2) that the error was obvious; and (3) 
that the error was prejudicial, specifically, that the error 
undermines this Court's confidence in the verdict. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Defendant has not met 
this burden. 
Defendant has not shown that the trial court erroneously 
interpreted "custody" for purposes of the assault by a prisoner 
statute, let alone that any such error was obvious. The sum of 
defendant's substantive argument on this issue reads as follows: 
Section 76-5-101 and other relevant statutory 
provisions do not define "custody." See id. 
"Custody," however, entails, inter alia, being "within 
the immediate personal care and control of the person 
to whose custody it is subjected." Black's Law 
Dictionary 347 (5th ed. 1979). Even according to 
focused on the credibility of the witnesses. 
By contrast, defendant argues on appeal that he could not have 
been in custody as a matter of law because the officers had not 
succeeded in handcuffing him at the time he assaulted Officer 
Watkins. Appellant's Brief at 9. Counsel's closing argument was 
not specific enough to preserve this appellate argument. See State 
v. Rancrel, 920802-CA slip op. at 7 (Utah App. December 29, 1993) 
(holding that while defendant's challenge to the application of a 
rule of evidence to his case preserved for appeal the question of 
whether the rule as applied violated due process, it did not 
preserve the issue of the rule's facial constitutionality). See 
also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 360-61. 
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Watkins, Pilling was not within his immediate control 
because Pilling had not been handcuffed at the time he 
swung and hit Watkins in the face.4 See Tr.67. 
Consequently, Pilling could not have been convicted, as 
a matter of law, of assault by a prisoner, because his 
conduct did not "fit within the statutory definitional 
element of [the] crime.11 Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 573. 
Appellant's Brief at 9 (emphasis added). Apparently, defendant 
argues that the plain meaning of "custody," as stated in Black's 
Law Dictionary, defines that term for purposes of determining 
whether he was a prisoner within the meaning of the assault by a 
prisoner statute. 
Admittedly, "statutory terms should be interpreted and 
applied according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the 
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is 
either 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, [] or in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'" State v. 
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993).5 However, the 
plain meaning of "custody" does not require police officers as a 
matter of law to handcuff a person to render that person in 
custody. 
4
 Officer Watkins did not testify that defendant was not in 
his control; only that defendant hit him while Officer Wood was 
trying to handcuff him. See Addendum C. 
5
 In Souza, this Court went on to indicate that "'if there is 
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the 
provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its 
entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its 
provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose.'" Id. 
Apparently believing that the plain meaning of custody controls, 
defendant has not considered this additional principle of statutory 
construction. Therefore, the State will not address this question. 
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First, even the truncated portion of the Black's definition 
defendant quotes fails to support his argument. According to 
defendant, a person is in custody when he is in the "immediate 
care and control" of another person. Appellant's Brief at 9.6 
However, exercising control over someone does not require 
handcuffing that person or even an equivalent level of physical 
restraint. Webster's defines "control" to include "to exercise 
authority over; direct; command". Webster's New World Dictionary 
309 (2nd college ed. 1968). Black's defines "control" as 
follows: 
Control, v. To exercise retraining or directing 
influence over. To regulate; restrain; dominate; curb; 
to hold from action; overpower; counteract; govern. 
Control, n. Power or authority to manage, direct, 
superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or 
oversee.... 
"Control," as used in statute making it unlawful 
for any person to possess or control any narcotic drug, 
is given its ordinary meaning, namely to exercise 
restraining or directing influence over, and also has 
been defined to relate to authority over what is not in 
one's physical possession." Speaks v. State, 3 Md.App. 
371, 239 A.2d 145, 147. 
Black's Law Dictionary 298 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). 
The complete definition of "custody" in Black's further 
supports the conclusion that handcuffing is not a requisite 
element of "custody": 
Custody. The care and control of a thing or person. 
The keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, 
preservation or security of a thing, carrying with it 
the idea of the thing being within the immediate 
6
 The portion of the Black's definition of custody on which 
defendant relies defines custody of property, not of persons. 
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personal care and control of the person to whose 
custody it is subjected. Immediate charge and control, 
and not the final, absolute control or ownership, 
implying responsibility for the protection and 
preservation of the thing in custody. Also the 
detainer of a man's person by virtue of lawful process 
or authority. 
The term is very elastic and may mean actual 
imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal 
or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual 
possession. Term "custody" within statute require that 
petitioner be " in custody" to be entitled to federal 
habeas corpus relief does not necessarily mean actual 
physical detention in jail or prison but rather is 
synonymous with restraint of liberty. . . . 
Accordingly, persons on probation or released on own 
recognizance have been held to be "in custody" for 
purposes of habeas corpus proceedings. 
Id. at 347 (emphasis added). (The relevant pages from Black's 
Law Dictionary are attached as Addendum B.) Thus, the plain 
meaning of custody encompasses a restraint of liberty that 
results either from some degree of physical restraint or from the 
mere legal power to exercise physical restraint. Even as to 
physical restraint, however, the plain meaning of custody does 
not specify a particular level of physical restraint and 
certainly does not require handcuffing. 
In interpreting their escape statutes, other jurisdictions 
have found that "custody" exists for purposes of those statutes 
even where police officers have not successfully handcuffed the 
defendant, or imposed any more physical restraint on the 
defendant than Officers Watkins and Wood imposed on defendant in 
this case. For example, in State v. Nakoa, 817 P.2d 1060 (Hawaii 
1991), an arresting police officer told the defendant that he was 
under arrest, to which the defendant responded, "yeah, yeah." 
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The police officer then placed his hand on the defendant's back, 
turned the defendant around, pushed him toward a stone wall, and 
instructed the defendant to put his hands on the stone wall, 
which the defendant did. The officer kept one hand on the 
defendant's back and reached for his handcuffs with the other; 
however, before the officer could place the handcuffs on the 
defendant, he jumped over the wall and ran from the officers. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the defendant was in "custody" 
when he escaped even though the officer had not handcuffed him. 
Id. at 1063-64. See also State v. Cole, 838 P.2d 1351, 1352-53 
(Ariz. App. 1992) (the defendant was under arrest, and therefore 
in custody, for purposes of Arizona's escape statute where the 
defendant was informed he was under arrest, and where the 
officers temporarily physically restrained defendant by clutching 
first his arms and then his shirt); State v. Solis, 685 P.2d 672, 
674 (Wash. App. 1984) (holding that a defendant was in a police 
officer's custody for purposes of Washington's escape statute at 
the time that she grabbed the defendant's arm and told him he was 
under arrest). 
Although Utah case law has not defined custody for purposes 
of the assault by a prisoner statute, the term is defined in the 
context of police interrogations. In State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court defined custody to exist 
"when any words or action of the police can reasonably be 
construed as placing the subject under some substantial physical 
or psychological control or restraint." Id. at 899 (citation 
12 
omitted). Physical restraint, let alone the physical restraint 
associated with handcuffing, is not necessary to render a person 
in "custody." 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that courts must 
consider four factors in determining whether a custodial 
interrogation has occurred: "'(1) the site of interrogation; (2) 
whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and 
form of interrogation.'" State v. Wood, 900194 slip op. at 15 & 
n.2 (Utah December 30, 1993) (quoting State v. Carner, 664 P.2d 
1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) (establishing these four factors as those 
necessary for consideration in determining whether questioning is 
custodial for state constitutional purposes)). Nothing on the 
face of these factors requires handcuffing, or even physical 
restraint. 
Indeed, in earner, the Utah Supreme Court referred to the 
absence of readied handcuffs, as opposed to handcuffs being 
secured in considering whether the objective indicia of arrest 
were present. State v. Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171. In State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), the court found that defendant 
Bishop was in custody even though he was not physically 
restrained, and even though he had not been told that he was 
under arrest. Id. at 460-62, 465. Thus, the Carner factors, 
both on their face and as applied, do not require handcuffing or 
equivalent physical restraint to render a person in custody. 
13 
Moreover, defendant has not even argued, much less shown, 
that any error was obvious. Nothing in the relevant statutes 
expressly requires handcuffing as an element of custody. 
Furthermore, the case law in this state defining custody when 
reviewing a police interrogation has not limited custody to 
situations where a defendant is handcuffed. Therefore, nothing 
would have indicated to the judge that it was obviously erroneous 
to allow the jury to convict defendant under the assault by a 
prisoner statute. 
Based on the above, defendant has failed to show that the 
trial court erroneously interpreted the assault by a prisoner 
statute or that any such error was obvious, and therefore, 
defendant has not met his appellate burden of establishing plain 
error.7 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE JURY'S VERDICT, NOR SHOWN THAT THE MARSHALLED 
EVIDENCE, WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
THE JURY'S VERDICT, FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION. 
Defendant argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence 
to support his conviction of assault by a prisoner. Before the 
Court may consider the merits of this argument, defendant has the 
burden of marshalling all of the evidence in support of his 
conviction, and of showing how, based on the marshalled evidence, 
a reasonable jury could not have convicted him. State v. Scheel, 
7
 Because defendant has failed to establish the first two 
elements of plain error, he has also failed to establish the third. 
State v. Brooks, 920853-CA, Slip op. at 11-12 (Utah App. January 
12, 1994) . 
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823 P.2d 470, 472-73 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
Defendant has not made either showing. 
Defendant does not identify in his argument any of the 
evidence supporting his conviction. Even if the Court considers 
the evidence summarized in his statement of facts, defendant has 
failed to marshal the following evidence supporting a conclusion 
that he was in custody at the time he assaulted Officer Watkins: 
(1) Officer Watkins testified that he advised defendant three 
times that he was under arrest, with the third time occurring 
after the officers had taken hold of defendant and just before 
Officer Wood attempted to handcuff him (Tr. 64-66) (defendant 
only identifies one of the earlier statements to defendant that 
he was under arrest); (2) just before Officer Wood attempted to 
handcuff defendant, defendant submitted to the officers' custody 
by putting his hands behind his back and stating, "Okay. Okay. 
I'm under arrest" (Tr. 67); and (3) Officer Watkins was still 
holding defendant's arm, and therefore physically restraining 
defendant, while Officer Wood attempted to handcuff him. 
Defendant has also failed to meet the second prong of his 
appellate burden: showing how the marshalled evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is so 
inconclusive or improbable that a reasonable jury could not have 
concluded that he was in custody. Id. To the contrary, 
defendant's argument amounts to nothing more than a 
recharacterization of the evidence in the light most favorable to 
his appellate argument. Defendant represents that Officer 
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"Watkins testified that, after he advised Pilling he was under 
arrest but before the arrest was actually effectuated, Pilling 
hit him with an object on the head," and that "[a]ccording to 
Watkins, Pilling was not in their custody at the time he struck 
Watkins because the officers were still attempting to place him 
in their custody." Appellant's Brief at 11. Contrary to 
defendant's representation of the record, Officer Watkins did not 
testify that he had not effectuated the arrest or that had not 
taken defendant into custody. The record citations on which 
defendant relies only contain Officer Watkins recitation of the 
events while the officers were attempting to handcuff defendant 
(Tr. 66-67). (These pages are attached as Addendum C.) His 
testimony only stands for the conclusion defendant draws from it 
if the Court accepts defendant's argument that he was not in 
custody because the officers had not successfully handcuffed him. 
By drawing these conclusions from Officer Watkins' testimony, 
defendant has done nothing more than recharacterize the evidence 
in the light most favorable to his theory; he has not shown how 
the marshalled evidence is so inconclusive that a reasonable jury 
could not have convicted him. Id. at 473 (holding that defendant 
failed to meet his appellate burden where his brief "attempt[ed] 
to reargue defendant's case by recounting a version of the facts 
most favorable to defendant while ignoring" evidence that was 
unfavorable). 
Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his burden of 
marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict or of showing 
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how the marshalled evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable 
minds must have maintained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's 
guilt. As a result, defendant has failed to establish that the 
record contains sufficient evidence to support his conviction of 
assault by a prisoner. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, defendant has failed to show that his 
conviction for assault by a prisoner is improper and the Court 
should therefore affirm that conviction. , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ft day of February, 
1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
an oral prescription, that is not obtained within ten days of the date 
the prescription was written or authorized, may not be filled or dis-
pensed. 
(g) An order for a controlled substance in Schedules II through V for 
use by an inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from 
all requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is: 
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient and designates 
the quantity ordered; 
(ii) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by 
the prescriber affirming his authorization of the order within 48 
hours after filling or administering the order, and the patient's record 
reflects the quantity actually administered; and 
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession 
within the physical structure of the hospital, or the order is taken 
from a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount 
taken from the supply is administered directly to the patient autho-
rized to receive it. 
(8) No information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an at-
tempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled 
substance is considered to be a privileged communication. 
tions (l)(a) and (2), rewrote the introductory 
paragraph of Subsection (3)(a), rewrote Subsec-
tion (3)(b), rewrote the introductory paragraph 
of Subsection (4)(a), and rewrote Subsection 
(5)(a) 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993 
inserted "denied" and made punctuator 
changes in Subsection (4)(a)(iv) 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any persor 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent tc 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub 
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfei 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business a 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substance 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess sue] 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a license* 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent t 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect tc 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a secon 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subset 
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 6; 1972, ch. 21, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 5; 1979, ch. 12, § 4; 1980, 
ch. 6, § 39; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, § 96; 1985, 
ch. 187, § 81; 1986, ch. 23, § 4; 1986, ch. 194, 
§ 13; 1987, ch. 92, § 99; 1987, ch. 161, § 202; 
1989, ch. 225, § 61; 1989, ch. 253, § 2; 1991, 
ch. 198, § 3; 1993, ch. 39, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, rewrote Subsec-
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place know-
ingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other person is 
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect 
to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance classified m Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confine-
ment shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any con-
trolled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all 
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or 
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through 
(2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a con-
trolled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not 
authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized 
by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be pun-
ished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are 
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chap-
ter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
tion or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly 
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
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(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself 
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to pre-
scribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or 
obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any con-
trolled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to 
disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, 
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or 
address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any ap-
plication, report, or other document required to be kept by this chap-
ter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, or-
der, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not au-
thorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, 
or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is 
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsec-
tion (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
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(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsec-
tion would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act oc-
curred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maxi-
mum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction autho-
rized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been con-
victed of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or 
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within 
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to V2 the maximum sentence imposed by 
law for the offense committed. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was con-
victed. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time 
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event 
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later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the 
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a 
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allega-
tion of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his 
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the conse-
quences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of 
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Sub-
section (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or de-
nies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evi-
dence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous 
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was par-
doned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the 
evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant 
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing 
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, the defen-
dant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appro-
priate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion deter-
mines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b). 
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evi-
dence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, I 3; 19SS, ch. 95, § 1; 
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 
1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
§ 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 161, effective April 23, 1990, in-
serted "to obtain a prescription for" and "or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving 
any controlled substance from another source" 
in Subsection (4)(a)(ii) and corrected two refer-
ence errors in Subsection (13). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, § 2, effec-
tive from April 23, 1990 until July 1, 1990, 
corrected reference errors in Subsections (9)(a) 
and (13Kb). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, § 3, effec-
tive July 1,1990, substituted "Section 77-18-1" 
for "Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure" in Subsection (9)(a). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 29, 1991, in Subsection (5)(a), inserted 
Subsection (ii), redesignated former Subsection 
(ii) as (iii), substituted "or institution under 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Admissibility of evidence. 
Arranging sale. 
Distribution. 
—Distribution for value. 
Evidence. 
Possession. 
—Amount. 
Search and seizure. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
In accord with bound volume. See State v. 
Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Subsection (5) does not violate a defendant's 
due process rights by imposing an enhanced 
penalty for violations that take place within 
1,000 feet of a school. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989). 
Subsection (5)(d), which eliminates lack of 
knowledge about the aggravating factor's pres-
ence as a defense for the enhanced penalty, 
does rvot violate due process. State v. Moore, 
782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
Subsection (5) does not violate equal protec-
tion on the ground that it treats drug dealers 
in small towns differently from those in large 
cities, since all defendants state-wide who dis-
tribute a controlled substance for value within 
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii)" for "under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i)" in Subsection (iii), inserted 
Subsections (iv) through (viii), redesignated 
formeT Subsections ttii) and i\\) as Ux) and ix), 
and substituted "Subsections (5)(a)(i) through 
(vii)" for "Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii)" in Subsec-
tion (ix); substituted "Chapter 37a, Title 58, 
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act or Chapter 37b, 
Title 58, Imitation Controlled Substances Act" 
for "Chapters 37a or 37b, Title 58" in Subsec-
tion (13)(a); and added Subsection (14) (appear-
ing as Subsection (13) after January 1, 1992). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
April 29, 1991, substituted all of the present 
language after "Schedules II through V" in 
Subsection (lKaXiii) for "under an order or pre-
scription," and made stylistic changes in the 
introductory paragraph of Subsection (5)(a). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 268, effective 
January 1, 1992, deleted former Subsection 
(13), imposing a fee of $150 against each per-
son convicted of, and each juvenile found 
within the court's jurisdiction because of, com-
mitting an offense and providing for the use of 
funds generated by the fee. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
1,000 feet of a public school are governed by 
the statute and susceptible to its enhanced 
penalties. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989). 
The penalty enhancement provision of Sub-
section (5)(a)(iii) is not unconstitutional, since 
the distinction between simple possession of 
controlled substances and possession in prox-
imity to a school is a valid one, reasonably re-
lated to the legislative purpose of creating a 
drug-free environment around schoolchildren. 
State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
Admissibility of evidence. 
Evidence of defendant's possession of mari-
juana, similarly packaged, twelve days prior to 
the offense charged, was properly admitted, 
where the contested evidence was particularly 
probative on the issue of constructive posses-
sion and was illustrative of defendant's com-
mon plan of marijuana distribution. State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Arranging sale. 
The offense of arranging the distribution for 
value of a controlled substance does not require 
the actual distribution. All that is needed is 
the arrangement for such distribution, coupled 
with knowledge or intent. Evidence of an ac-
tual sale may be helpful, or even necessary, in 
proving knowledge or intent, but sale itself is 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object con-
cerning its use; 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or de-
pict its use; 
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate 
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed 
distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object 
to the total sales of the business enterprise; 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the 
community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 4. 
Cross-References. — Expert witnesses, 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 et seq 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a con-
trolled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person 
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise intro-
duce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 5. Cross-References. — Penalty for misde-
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
act" means Laws 1981, ch 76, §§ 1 to 6, which Penalty for felonies, §§ 76-3-203, 76-3-301 
appear as §§ 58-37a-l to 58-37a-6 
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PART 1 
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
f6-5-101. "Prisoner" defined. 
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of a 
>eace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other 
»enal institution regardless of whether the confinement is legal. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bod-
ily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-101, enacted by L. 
973, ch. 196, § 76-5-101. 
6-5-102. Assault. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102, enacted by L. 
74, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 51, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1974, 
. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102, as en-
ted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-102, relating 
assault, and enacted present § 76-5-102. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ANALYSIS 
fFerent offense. 
idence. 
luded offenses. 
ent. 
ject of threat. 
Victim. 
rdict. 
ed. 
ferent offense. 
Vhere jury returned verdict that defendant 
j guilty of attempt to commit rape, court 
Id not enter judgment that defendant was 
Ity of different offense of assault with intent 
ommit rape. State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 
P. 349 (1924). 
dence. 
Production of defendant's commitment pa-
i to establish that defendant was an inmate 
he state prison was proper in prosecution 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsec-
tion (l)(c). 
Cross-References. — Bus hijacking, as-
sault with intent to commit, § 76-10-1504. 
Power of city to prohibit assault and battery, 
§ 10-8-47. 
for assault by a convict with a deadly weapon. 
State v. Duran, 522 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1974). 
Included offenses. 
In prosecution under former § 76-7-7, which 
described offense of assault with intent to com-
mit rape or mayhem, court had to instruct jury 
that defendant could be convicted of simple as-
sault; attempt to commit offense charged was 
included in the offense under former Penal 
Code definition of attempts. State v. Hyams, 64 
Utah 285, 230 P. 349 (1924). 
In prosecution for rape, it was not error to 
charge that assault was an included offense 
where the evidence would have supported a 
finding of the elements of this crime. State v. 
Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936). 
Crime of simple assault was included in of-
fense of indecent assault. State v. Waid, 92 
Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937). 
The offense of assault is a lesser included 
offense of aggravated sexual assault, § 76-5-
405. State v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-103 
76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.5, enacted by L. 
1974, ch. 32, § 33. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS the videotape of all bookings, including the de-
fendant's, was erased and recycled after 72 
Assault against peace officer. hours if there was no request to retain it, and 
Evidence of assault. the defendant sought dismissal of the charge 
-Sufficient. that she, while in custody, had assaulted a po-
kssault against peace officer. l i c e officer, because there was no showing that 
This section and § 76-5-102.4 do not pro- loss of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the 
cribe identical conduct when the assault is i s s u e o f t h e defendant's guilt, the trial court 
gainst a peace officer. The statutes apply to e r r e d in dismissing the assault charge. State v. 
ifferent classes of persons, the former apply- Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
rig to "any person" and the latter applying to «„#««•««• 
any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 — ^ u m c i e i V : 
Utah Ct ADD 1989) ^ ve r ("c t» implicitly rejecting statutory pp
* defenses of self-defense and defense of habita-
Ividence of assault tion, was supported by the evidence. State v. 
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Ct. App. 1989). 
6-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
l Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 76-1-601" for "deadly weapon" in Subsection 
>73, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; (l)(b) and made stylistic changes throughout 
>89, ch. 170, § 2. the section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101. 
ent, effective April 24, 1989, substituted Possession of a dangerous weapon with in-
angerous weapon as defined in Section tent to assault, § 76-10-507. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Victim. 
Recklessness, 
mgerous weapon. Self-defense, 
jfense of habitation. Serious bodily injury. 
ridence. Threatening with dangerous weapon distin-
Sufficient. guished. 
iictment or information. Voluntary intoxication, 
structions. Cited 
Flight. 
ry question. Dangerous weapon. 
sser included offense. Under former statute which described as-
mtal element. sault with deadly weapon, character of weapon 
ject of threat. could be inferred from wounds or other indicia, 
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76-5-103.5 CRIMINAL CODE 
ening manner, and a person convicted under defendant of criminal responsibility for reck-
this section is not entitled to receive the misde- less acts. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 
meanor penalty provided by § 76-10-506. State 1985). 
v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979). „ .
 J . 0 Tjr. m rt ^ J n T , 
Cited in State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240 (Utah 
Voluntary intoxication. 1985); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 
A defendant's voluntary intoxication does 1986); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 
not preclude his conviction for aggravated as- 1988); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
sault since criminal responsibility for that 1988); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 
crime can be established through recklessness, 1988); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. 
and voluntary intoxication does not absolve a App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting 
Battery § 48. criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 507. 
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery Criminal assault or battery statutes making 
§ 72. attack on elderly person a special or aggra-
A.L.R. — Kicking as aggravated assault, or vated offense, 73 A.L.R.4th 1123. 
assault with dangerous or deadly weapon, 33 Key Numbers. — Assault and Battery *» 
A.L.R.3d 922. 54. 
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner. 
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a felony of the first degree, who 
commits aggravated assault is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a felony of the first degree who 
commits aggravated assault is guilty of: 
(a) A felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury was caused; or 
(b) A capital felony if serious bodily injury was intentionally caused. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103.5, enacted by L. 
1974, ch. 32, § 34. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Evidence. was on trial, i.e., to show that he was in fact a 
It was permissible for the state to introduce prisoner" at the time of the assault. State v. 
evidence of defendant's prior conviction to Lancaster, 765 P.2d 872 (Utah 1988). 
prove an element of the offense for which he 
76-5-104. Consensual altercation no defense to homicide 
or assault if dangerous weapon used. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or 
assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to 
any duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course 
of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 was used. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-104, enacted by L. "dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-104; 1989, ch. 170, § 3. 76-1-601" for "deadly weapon" and made minor 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT 76-8-309 
76-8-308. Acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent crimi-
nal prosecution — Defense. 
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(a) Solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for 
his refraining from initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution; or 
(b) Confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon another as 
consideration for the person refraining from initiating or aiding in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(2) It is an affirmative defense that the value of the benefit did not exceed 
an amount which the actor believed to be due as restitution or indemnification 
for the loss caused or to be caused by the offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-308, enacted by L. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal pro-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-308. ceeding, § 76-8-509. 
Cross-References. — Bribery involving 
tampering with or retaliation against a wit-
ness or informant, § 76-8-508. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1. 
Key Numbers. — Extortion «=» 1. 
76-8-309. Escape — Term for escape from state prison, 
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if: 
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly weapon against any 
person to effect the escape; or 
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the state prison. Otherwise, 
escape is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) "Official custody," for the purpose of this section, means arrest, custody 
in a penal institution, jail, an institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, 
or other confinement pursuant to an order of the court. For purposes of this 
section a person is deemed to be confined in the Utah state prison if he has 
been sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole. 
(4) The term imposed upon a person escaping confinement in the state 
prison shall commence from the time the actor would otherwise have been 
discharged from the prison on the term or terms which he was serving. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-309, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-309. 
Cross-References. — Department of Cor-
rections, Chapter 13 of Title 64. 
Escape from state hospital, § 62A-12-226. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONTRIBUTIONE FACIENDA 298 
Contribution facienda /kontrabyuwshiyowniy faeshiyan-
da/ In old English law, a writ that lay where tenants 
in common were bound to do some act, and one of 
them was put to the whole burthen, to compel the 
rest to make contribution 
Contribution to capital. A fund or property contributed 
by shareowners as financial basis for operation of 
corporation's business, and signifies resources whose 
dedication to users of the corporation is made the 
foundation for issuance of capital stock and which 
became irrevocably devoted to satisfaction of all obli-
gations of corporation See also Capital. 
Contributory, n A person liable to contribute to the 
assets of a company which is being wound up, as 
being a member or (in some cases) a past member 
thereof 
Contributory, adj Joining in the promotion of a given 
purpose, lending assistance to the production of a 
given result Said of a pension plan where employ-
ees, as well as employers, make payments to a pen-
sion fund 
As to contributory "Infringement" and "Negli-
gence," see those titles 
Contributory cause. See Cause; Contributing cause; 
Negligence (Contributory negligence) 
Contributory negligence. See Negligence. 
Contrivance. Any device which has been arranged gen-
erally to deceive An instrument or article designed 
to accomplish a specific objective and made by use of 
measure of ingenuity 
Control, v To exercise restraining or directing influ-
ence over To regulate, restrain, dominate, curb, to 
hold from action, overpower, counteract, govern 
Control, n Power or authority to manage, direct, su-
perintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or 
oversee The "control" involved in determining 
whether "principal and agent relationship" or "mas-
ter and servant relationship" is involved must be 
accompanied by power or right to order or direct 
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v Vicars, 221 
Ind 387, 47 N E 2d 972 
"Control," as used in statute making it unlawful 
for any person to possess or control any narcotic 
drug, is given its ordinary meaning, namely, to 
exercise restraining or directing influence over, and 
also has been defined to relate to authority over what 
is not in one's physical possession. Speaks v. State, 
3 Md App 371, 239 A 2d 600, 604 
Rule that driver must at all times have automobile 
under control, means having it under such control 
that it can be stopped before doing injury to any 
person m any situation that is reasonably likely to 
arise under the circumstances Kindt v Reading Co , 
352 Pa 419, 43 A 2d 145, 147 
See also Exclusive control; Immediate control. 
Controlled company. A company, a majority of whose 
voting stock is held by an individual or corporation 
Effective control can sometimes be exercised when 
less than 50 percent of the stock is owned 
Controlled substance. Any narcotic drug so designated 
by law, i e so designated by federal or state Con-
trolled Substances Acts (q v) 
Controlled Substance Acts. Federal and state acts (the 
latter modeled on the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act) the purpose of which is to control the distribu-
tion, classification, sale, and use of drugs The ma-
jority of states have such acts 
Controller. See Comptroller. 
Controlment /kantrolnwnt/ In old English law, the 
controlling or checking of another officer's account, 
the keeping of a counter-roll 
Controver /kwitrowvw/ In old English law, an inven-
tor or deviser of false news 
Controversy. A litigated question, adversary proceed-
ing in a court of law, a civil action or suit, either at 
law or in equity, a justiciable dispute To be a 
"controversy" under federal constitutional provision 
limiting exercise of judicial power of United States to 
cases and controversies there must be a concrete case 
admitting of an immediate and definitive determina-
tion of legal rights of parties in an adversary proceed-
ing upon facts alleged, and claims based merely upon 
assumed potential invasions of rights are not enough 
to warrant judicial intervention Southern Ry Co v 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engmemen, 
D C Ga , 223 F Supp 296, 303 This term is impor 
tant in that judicial power of the courts extends only 
to cases and "controversies " See Case; Cause of 
action; Justiciable controversy. 
Controvert To dispute, to deny, to oppose or contest, 
to take issue on 
Contubernium /kontabarniyam/ In Roman law, the 
mamage of slaves, a permitted cohabitation 
Contumace capiendo /kdntameysiy kapiyendow/ In 
English law, excommunication in all cases of con-
tempt in the spiritual courts is discontinued by 53 
Geo III, c 127, § 2, and in lieu thereof, where a 
lawful citation or sentence has not been obeyed, the 
judge shall have power, after a certain period, to 
pronounce such person contumacious and in con-
tempt, and to signify the same to the court of chan-
cery, whereupon a writ de contumace capiendo shall 
issue from that court, which shall have the same 
force and effect as formerly belonged, in case of 
contempt, to a writ de excommunicato capiendo See 
Excommunication. 
Contumacious conduct Wilfully stubborn and diso-
bedient conduct, commonly punishable as contempt 
of court See Contempt 
Contumacy /kont(y)anwsiy/ The refusal or intentional 
omission of a person who has been duly cited before 
a court to appear and defend the charge laid against 
him, or, if he is duly before the court, to obey some 
lawful order or direction made in the cause In the 
former case it is called "presumed" contumacy, in 
the latter, "actual" 
Contumax /kontamaks/ One accused of a crime who 
refuses to appear and answer to the charge An 
outlaw. 
347 CUSTOMARY SERVICES 
Custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation, re-
quiring that defendant be advised of his constitutional 
rights, means questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after person has been taken into custo-
dy or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any signif-
icant way; custody can occur without formality of 
arrest and in areas other than in police station. Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 
S.Ct. 1232. See Miranda Rule. 
Custodiam lease /kastowdiysm Uys/. In old English 
law, a grant from the crown under the exchequer 
seal, by which the custody of lands, etc., seised in the 
king's hands, was demised or committed to some 
person as custodee or lessee thereof. 
Custodian. General term to describe anyone who has 
charge or custody of property, papers, etc. 
Custody. The care and control of a thing or person. 
The keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, pres-
ervation or security of a thing, carrying with it the 
idea of the thing being within the immediate personal 
care and control of the person to whose custody it is 
subjected. Immediate charge and control, and not 
the final, absolute control of ownership, implying 
responsibility for the protection and preservation of 
the thing in custody. Also the detainer of a man's 
person by virtue of lawful process or authority. 
The term is very elastic and may mean actual 
imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, 
legal or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual 
possession. Term "custody" within statute requiring 
that petitioner be "in custody" to be entitled to feder-
al habeas corpus relief does not necessarily mean 
actual physical detention in jail or prison but rather is 
synonymous with restraint of liberty. U. S. ex rel. 
Wirtz v, Sheehan, D.C.Wis., 319 F.Supp. 146, 147. 
Accordingly, persons on probation or released on 
own recognizance have been held to be "in custody" 
for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings. 
See Chain of custody; Custodial interrogation; Pro-
tective custody. 
Custody account. A type of agency account in which 
the custodian has the obligation to preserve and safe-
keep the property entrusted to him for his principal. 
Custody of children. The care, control and mainte-
nance of a child which may be awarded by a court to 
one of the parents as in a divorce or separation 
proceeding. A number of states have adopted the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See also 
Guardianship. 
Custody of the law. Property is in the custody of the 
law when it has been lawfully taken by authority of 
legal process, and remains in the possession of a 
public officer (as a sheriff) or an officer of a court (as 
a receiver) empowered by law to hold it. See Forfei-
ture; Seizure. 
Custom and usage. A usage or practice of the people, 
which, by common adoption and acquiescence, and 
by long and unvarying habit, has become compulsory, 
and has acquired the force of a law with respect to 
the place or subject-matter to which it relates. It 
results from a long series of actions, constantly re-
peated, which have, by such repetition and by unin-
terrupted acquiescence, acquired the force of a tacit 
and common consent. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. 
Reverman, 243 Ky. 702, 49 S.W.2d 558, 560. An 
habitual or customary practice, more or less wide-
spread, which prevails within a geographical or socio-
logical area; usage is a course of conduct based on a 
series of actual occurrences. Corbin-Dykes Elec. Co. 
v. Burr, 18 Ariz.App. 101, 500 P.2d 632, 634. 
Parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of cus-
tom or usage to explain or supplement a contract or 
memorandum of the parties. U.C.C. § 2-203. 
Classification. Customs are general, local or particu-
lar. General customs are such as prevail throughout 
a country and become the law of that country, and 
their existence is to be determined by the court. Or 
as applied to usages of trade and business, a general 
custom is one that is followed in all cases by all 
persons in the same business in the same territory, 
and which has been so long established that persons 
sought to be charged thereby, and all others living in 
the vicinity, may be presumed to have known of it 
and to have acted upon it as they had occasion. 
Local customs are such as prevail only in some par-
ticular district or locality, or in some city, county, or 
town. Particular customs are nearly the same, being 
such as affect only the inhabitants of some particular 
district. 
Usage distinguished. "Usage" is a repetition of acts, 
and differs from "custom" in that the latter is the law 
or general rule which arises from such repetition; 
while there may be usage without custom, there can-
not be a custom without a usage accompanying or 
preceding it. U. S. for Use of E & R Const. Co., Inc. 
v. Guy H. James Const. Co., D.C.Tenn., 390 F.Supp. 
1193, 1209. See also Usage. 
Customarily. Means usually, habitually, according to 
the customs; general practice or usual order of 
things; regularly. Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201, 203. 
Customary. According to custom or usage; founded 
on, or growing out of, or dependent on, a custom 
(q.v.); ordinary; usual; common. 
Customary court-baron. See Court-baron. 
Customary dispatch. Due diligence according to law-
ful, reasonable and well-known custom of port or 
ports involved. Context and conditions existing or 
contemplated will, of course, affect the meaning of 
the phrase. Taisho Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha v. Gano 
Moore Co., D.C.Del., 14 F.2d 985, 986. 
Customary estates. Estates which owe their origin and 
existence to the custom of the manor in which they 
are held. 2 Bl.Comm. 149. 
Customary freehold. In old English law, a variety of 
copyhold estate, the evidences of the title to which 
are to be found upon the court rolls; the entries 
declaring the holding to be according to the custom of 
the manor, but it is not said to be at the will of the 
lord. The incidents are similar to those of common 
or pure copyhold. 
Customary interpretation. See Interpretation. 
Customary services. Such as are due by ancient cus-
tom or prescription only. 
ADDENDUM C 
1 A It's a night stick with a handle on the side to 
2 make a — 
3 Q Is it about that long? 
4 A Yes, it is. 
5 Q Okay. It's what used to be called a baton; is 
6 that right? 
7 A It's just an off--from a baton, a baton is just 
8 straight, this has a handle 6ft the side. 
9 Q Okay. What is it made of? 
10 A I believe it's made of hard plastic substance. 
11 Q Okay. What happened when you swung at him with 
12 that? 
13 A He then stopped. 
14 Q Did you actually hit him with that? 
15 A No. Not at that time. 
16 Q Okay. What did he do after that? 
17 A He then was mumbling and started walking toward 
18 the door, or the exit out of the bedroom. 
19 Q And did he move past you and the deputy, o r — 
20 A He was starting to move past me. I grabbed him 
2i by t h e — t h e shoulder. 
22 Q And w h a t — d i d you say anything to him, or what 
23 happened? 
24 A I advised him he was under arrest, again. 
25 Q What did you do then? 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A He—we then walked into the living room and 
Mr. Pilling stood there, put his hands behind his back and 
advised 
Q 
A 
, "Okay. Okay. I'm under arrest." 
What happened then? 
Deputy 
arm, Deputy Wood 
on his 
Q 
success 
A 
Q 
A 
at that 
wrists. 
Wood, as I was holding Mr. Pilling1s left 
was attempting to apply handcuffs on his--
And did something happen after that? Was he 
ful in applying the handcuffs? 
No. He wasn'1. 
What happened? 
Deputy 
time, he 
Wood's handcuffs were malfunctioning, and 
removed his hand—Deputy Wood did, to fix 
the handcuffs. Mr. Pilling went down into a—a stance, 
pulled 
on the 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
something from his crotch area, stood up and hit me 
side of the head. 
Did you see what he pulled out? 
No. I 
Did he 
It was 
Okay. 
It was 
Okay. 
In the 
Okay. 
didn't. 
pull it out from his pants or his pocket? 
in that area. 
Describe what you saw. 
a black blur, that's all I saw. 
And where did he strike you? 
left side of the face. 
So, would he have used his right hand to 1 
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